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NOTES

Treaty
Missile
The Anti-Ballistic
Debate: Time for Some Clarification
of the
President's Authority to
Terminate a Treaty
ABSTRACT

This Note explores the legal issues surrounding a
president's legal authority to unilaterally withdraw from a
treaty. This Note argues that, while international legal issues
surrounding treaty termination are not controversial, the
domestic legal issues surrounding the president's authority to
terminate a treaty are heavily disputed. An analysis of these
domestic legal issues does not resolve the controversy. Instead,
this Note argues that a functional analysis is required. This
functional analysis reveals that the president should have the
power to unilaterally terminate a treaty because it maintains
foreign policy effectiveness. The Note then argues that the
Senate, which informally recognizes this presidential power,
should recognize it formally through a Senate resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush announced his
decision to terminate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 1
President Bush's announcement, was 'significant in two respects.
First, the unilateral presidential termination of a treaty is fairly
unique in U.S. history. 2 Second, the legal aspects surrounding the
3
termination of treaties are heavily disputed and highly controversial.
This Note first takes a look at the background and text of the ABM
Treaty. Following this introduction to the ABM Treaty, the Note
takes an in-depth look at the domestic history of the treaty and the

1.
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses National
Missile Defense (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/12/print/20011213-4.html. See Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
2.
See David E. Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. to Pull Out of ABM Treaty,
ClearingPath for Antimissile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at 1.
3.
David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791,
1848 n.180 (1998).
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national missile defense (NMD) debate. Then, this Note sets forth
the international and domestic legal concerns surrounding unilateral
termination of a treaty. With respect to the domestic legal concerns,
this Note focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court case Goldwater v.
Carter, the leading case dealing with treaty termination. 4 Finally,
this Note presents a potential resolution to the current debate.

II.

THE BACKGROUND AND TEXT OF THE TREATY

At the height of the Cold War, both the United States and the
Soviet Union feared the outbreak of nuclear war. 5 The driving force
behind each country's nuclear policy, which was employed to prevent
such a war, was the'doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD). 6 The basic premise of this doctrine is that a country will not
launch a preemptive first strike as long as the country it is attacking
maintains a second strike capability that can cause massive damage
to the initial aggressor.7 MAD cannot deter war if either of two
scenarios arise.8 First, if either country fails to maintain an effective
retaliatory capability, then the other country may be tempted to
launch a preemptive strike. 9 Second, if either country develops a
shield to protect it from a nuclear attack, then MAD would be
undermined. 10
In the 1960s, a concern existed that both of those factors were
working against the United States.'
The Soviet Union was in the
midst of a buildup that could have directly threatened the second
strike capabilities of the United States by allowing the Soviets to
destroy the U.S. retaliatory capabilities with a Soviet first strike. 12
In addition, the Soviet Union was working on two different types of
missile defense systems.' 3 In this atmosphere,. President Lyndon
Johnson wanted to start negotiations with the Soviet.Union so that
the two nations could reach agreements that would limit the Soviet
buildup and ban missile defense systems. 14 The concerns over the

4.
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
5.
See David Edward Grogan, Power Play: Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense,
National Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 799, 803
(1999).
6.
Id. at 804.

7.

Id.

8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id. at 804-05.
Id. at 805.

11.

PAUL H. NITZE, FROM HIROSHIMA TO GLASTNOST 286-87 (1989).

12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 287.
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need to limit the arms race carried over to the Nixon administration
and ultimately led to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT)
with the Soviets. 15 These talks began in Helsinki in November
1969.16

It was not until 1972 that each side finally agreed on the

ABM Treaty and an interim agreement limiting offensive nuclear
weapons. 17 Both were signed at a summit in Moscow in May 1972.18

Several
The ABM Treaty codified the MAD doctrine. 19
provisions of the treaty were particularly important and should be
discussed at this point.2 0 First, several articles of the treaty explicitly
banned ABM systems. Article II defined an ABM system as a missile
system that has the purpose of countering "strategic ballistic missiles

or their elements in flight trajectory."'21 An ABM system included the
ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars.2 2 Article II also
specified that systems that are under construction or undergoing

testing are included in the definition of an ABM system. 23 Article I
banned ABM systems, as defined in Article II, for the defense of the
territories of each country and banned each country from providing a
"base for such a defense. ''2 4 Article V mandated that each party not

See id. at 295.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Grogan, supra note 5, at 806.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 1,11, V.
Id. art. I. The full text of Article 1I is as follows:

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
1.

2.

For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently
consisting of:
a.

ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed
and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

b.

ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for
launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

c.

ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM
role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this article include
those which are:
a.

operational;

b.

under construction;

c.

undergoing testing;

d.

undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

e.

mothballed.

Id.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. art I. Article I provides that:
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"develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea'25
based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land based.
Second, two exceptions to this general prohibition were provided
in Article III of the treaty. 26 One exception was for an ABM system
centered on each nation's capital, and the other exception was for a
system centered on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field
in each nation.2 7 The purpose of both of these exceptions was to
maintain each nation's retaliatory capability in the event of a first
strike. 28 The first exception allowed protection of the nation's capital

1.

Each Party undertakes to limit ant-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and
to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2.

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the
territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and
not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as
provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Id.
25.

Id. art. V. Article V of the Treaty states that:

1. Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
2. Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each
launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a
capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or
other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Id.
26.
Id. art. II. Article III provides, "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM
systems or their component parts except that"
a. Within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred
and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party
may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more
than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM
radars within no more than six radar complexes, the area of each complex
being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and
b. Within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred
and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a party may

deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one
hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phase-array
ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars
operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in
an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3)
no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the
potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased array
ABM radars.

Id.
27.
28.

Id.
Grogan, supra note 5, at 808 n.49.
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29
because strategic command centers are located in the capital areas.
Each country needed to maintain these command centers so it could
effectively respond to a first strike. 30 The second exception allowed
for the protection of an ICBM field because if at least one field could
be protected in the event of a first strike, then it would ensure a
31
In 1974, the
devastating retaliatory capability for both nations.
AMB Treaty was amended to limit each nation to only one ABM
system, so that each nation could protect either its capital or an
32
ICBM field, but not both.
Third, Article XIII of the ABM Treaty established the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC). 33 The Commission's tasks were to
"resolve compliance issues, share information, resolve questions,
consider amendments, and even consider changes in the strategic

Grogan, supra note 5, at 808.
29.
Id. at 804.
30.
Id. at 808.
31.
Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
32.
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July
3, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. I, 27 U.S.T. 1647. While the United States never pursued a
system falling within the exception to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union maintained
the "Galosh" system that protected Moscow. Grogan, supra note 5, at 809.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIII. Article XIII provides:
33.
1.

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this
Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative
Commission, within the framework of which they will:
a.
Consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations
assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
b.

c.

Consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a
bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;
e. Agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of
ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the
provisions of this Treaty;
f.
Consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing
the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;'
Consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at
g.
limiting strategic arms.
The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as
appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission
governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.
d.

2.

Provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party
considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the
obligations assumed;
Consider questions involving unintended interference with national
technical means of verification;
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situation having a bearing on the treaty." 34 The SCC met at least
twice annually, which provided an opportunity for ongoing dialogues
35
between the two nations.
36
Fourth, the ABM Treaty had two built-in escape clauses.
Article XIV provided that each party "may propose amendments to
this Treaty. '37 Article XV allowed a party to withdraw from the
Treaty under certain circumstances. 38 More specifically, Article XV
provided that, "each party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have a right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
'39
have jeopardized its supreme interests.

III.

THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE

A. PresidentReagan's StrategicDefense Initiative
Former President Ronald Reagan first thought of the idea to
pursue a ballistic missile defense system when he visited the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which was built
into Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. 40 Reagan visited NORAD in
1979, prior to his presidential election in 1980.41 During his visit,

34.
35.
36.
37.

Grogan, supra note 5, at 814.
Id.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. XIV, XV.
Id. art. XIV. Article XIV states:

1.

Each- party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments
shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the
entry into force of this Treaty.

2.

Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals
thereafter, the Parties shall together-conduct a review of this Treaty.

Id.
38.

Id. art. XV. Article XV provides:

1.

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2.

Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related
to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months
prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as
having jeopardized its Supreme interests.

Id.
39.
Id.
40.
John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the
Separation ofPowers, and Treaty Interpretation,89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 851 (2001).
41.
Id.
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Reagan was struck by the fact that the United States had no
capability of stopping even a single Soviet missile from striking the
United States. 42 In 1983, Reagan formally announced his decision to
pursue a "space-based X-ray and laser weapons system that could
shoot down Soviet missiles in flight. '4 3 The Reagan Administration
called this system the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).44 While this
system never fully developed technologically, the announcement
proved to be a great success for the United States strategically. 45 The
Soviets' fear of a U.S. missile shield forced them to the negotiating
46
table.
Reagan did not just want a bargaining device through SDI; his
administration sought an operational system. 47 A major obstacle to
developing, testing, and deploying Reagan's SDI was, of course, the
Recall that Article V specifically banned the
ABM Treaty.4 8
development of space-based ABM systems. 49 Reagan called upon
Judge Abraham Sofaer, the legal advisor to the State Department, to
50
conduct a study of whether Reagan's SDI violated the Treaty.
51
Sofaer argued that the Treaty did not prohibit all ABM systems.
He believed that Agreed Statement D, which accompanied the Treaty,
permitted "ABM systems and components 'based on' . . . technologies
not used in the systems and components described and regulated in
the Treaty. '5 2 Agreed Statement D provided:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the
ABM Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on
other physical principles and including components capable of
substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems
and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with
Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the
Treaty.

53

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 855.
See id.
Id. at 858.

48.

See discussion supra Part II.

49.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. V.
50.
Yoo, supra note 40, at 858.
51.
Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative,
99 HARv. L. REV. 1972 (1986).
Id. at 1972-73; ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Statement D.
52.
53.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Statement D.
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Reagan's SDI was, according to Sofaer, an "exotic" system comprised
of technologies that did not exist at the time of the adoption of the
54
Treaty.
Sofaer supported his theory with a textual analysis of the Treaty,
the ABM negotiating record between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and post-negotiation statements by the United
States. 5 5
First, Sofaer said his argument could be supported
textually because the definition of an ABM system given in Article II
of the Treaty can plausibly be read to apply only to systems then in
existence. 56 In addition, Sofaer cited Agreed Statement D in support
of his interpretation. 57 Second, Sofaer looked to the ABM negotiating
record.58 Even though the negotiating record was classified, Sofaer
was able to analyze some of the details of the negotiations that were
discussed.5 9 Sofaer argued that the evidence revealed that while the
United States tried to ban all systems, the Soviets wanted to limit the
ban to those systems currently in existence. 60 According to Sofaer,
the Soviets won this debate; as a result, the Treaty allowed
deployment of an ABM system based on technology not in existence in
1972.61 Finally, Sofaer looked to the post-negotiation statements by
the United States. 6 2 Sofaer cited statements by the U.S. State
Department, by witnesses during the ratification process, and by
officials after ratification.6 3
According to Sofaer, all of these
statements indicated that the Treaty allowed for the creation of an
ABM system based on technology not in existence at the time the
64
Treaty was adopted.
In October 1985, the Reagan Administration announced the
Sofaer reading of the ABM Treaty as its policy. 65 This sparked a
controversy over the proper interpretation' of the Treaty that
eventually caused the Reagan administration to announce that, while
it still believed in the validity of its broad interpretation of the ABM
Treaty, it would adhere to the more narrow interpretation of the
Treaty that prohibited any form of a national ballistic missile defense
system.6 6 Ultimately, Reagan's SDI never left the research and

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Yoo, supra note 40, at 858-59.
Sofaer, supra note 51, at 1973-84.
Id. at 1974.
Id. at 1975.
Id. at 1978.
Id.
Id. at 1980.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1981-83.
Id.
Yoo, supra note 40, at 859.
Id. at 859-60.
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It did, however, start a debate on the
development stage.6 7
of a national missile defense (NMD)
deployment
legitimacy of actual
time. 68
some
quite
for
continued
that
system
B. President Clinton's National Missile Defense Policy
Moving in history from Reagan's announcement of SDI to the
important
some
skips
admittedly
administration
Clinton
developments in the NMD debate. Nevertheless, for the purposes of
this Note, an extensive historical review is unnecessary. Instead,
having provided a limited background of the origins of the ABM
Treaty interpretation debate, this Note moves forward.
One of the main focuses of the Clinton administration was
abandoning the development of a NMD system, which was
impermissible under the Treaty, and moving toward developing a
working theatre missile defense (TMD) system, which was
permissible under the Treaty. 69 The purpose behind TMD is to
protect U.S. forces, population centers, fixed civilian and military
assets, and mobile military units from theatre missile attacks. 70 The
Patriot Missile is probably the most famous of the TMD systems
because of its use in the Gulf War.7 ' The four core types of TMD
systems under development are the Army Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 system, the Navy Area Defense system, the Army
Theatre High Altitude Air Defense system, and the Navy Theatre
72
Wide system.
The development of these systems was surrounded with
controversy. Recall that Article I of the ABM Treaty banned "ABM
systems" and Article II defined such systems as those that "counter
strategic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." 73 The United
States defined strategic missiles as those missiles with
Therefore, according to TMD
intercontinental capability. 74
supporters, defense systems could be deployed that had the capability
and not
missiles
theatre ballistic
against
of defending
75
intercontinental missiles with no ABM Treaty compliance problems.
The problem with TMD systems was that, while in theory they did
not violate the ABM Treaty, should they have been capable of

JAMES LINDSAY & MICHAEL O'HANLON, DEFENDING AMERICA: THE CASE
67.
FOR LIMITED NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE 3 (2001).

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See discussion infra Part II.B.-C.
See Grogan, supra note 5, at 832.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 819.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 1,11.
Grogan, supra note 5, at 812-13.
Id.
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defending against strategic ballistic missiles-and not just theatre
ballistic missiles-they would not have been in compliance with the
Treaty.7 6 This area of uncertainty meant that Clinton had to pursue
negotiations with the Russians regarding what qualified as a TMD
system and what qualified as an NMD system. 77 After extensive
negotiations, the dispute was not fully settled, thus leaving
78
compliance issues largely to the discretion of each nation.
While NMD took a backseat to TMD, it still remained an
important topic during the Clinton administration. 79 Two things
should be considered when looking at the NMD debate in the 1990s
and continuing into this century. First, the debate surrounding NMD
was slightly different because NMD was explicitly banned under the
Treaty, so there was not nearly as much room to maneuver as with
TMD.8 0 Second, the world changed, which had a major impact on the
ABM Treaty debates.8 ' First, the Soviet Union dissolved in late
1991.82
Opponents of the Treaty argued that the collapse of the
Soviet Union meant that the Treaty was no longer binding.8 3 The
argument followed that because "there [was] no state, or group of
states, capable of fulfilling the Soviet Union's obligations under the
Treaty," then the United States should not have been bound by the
Treaty.8 4 Another important change is that more than 20 Third
World countries now possess ballistic missiles.8 5 These nations
include Iran, Libya, and North Korea.8 6 The ABM Treaty was
adopted at a time when only the United States and the Soviet Union
were threats to one another.87 Times changed, according to the
opponents of the ABM Treaty; as a result, reluctance to build a NMD
88
system should subside.
The changes in the world led many to argue that the United
States should have amended or abandoned the ABM Treaty to allow
for actual deployment of a NMD system. 8 9 Notice that the text of the
ABM Treaty dealt primarily with the deployment of a NMD system. 90

76.
Id. at 813.
77.
See id.
78.
See id. at 855.
79.
Id. at 816.
80.
See discussion supraPart II.
81.
Baker Spring, Why the ABM Treaty is Already Dead and What it Should
Mean for American National Security, 4 NEXUS 31, 31 (1999).
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 37.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
See id.
89.
See id. at 42.
90.
See discussion supraPart II.
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Over the years, the Treaty was interpreted to allow both the United
States and the Soviet Union to research, develop, and test an NMD
system provided that it was non-mobile and land-based. 9 1
Researching, developing, and testing appeased NMD advocates
92
did not settle whether an NMD system would be deployed.
it
but
The 1990s marked a time of tumultuous NMD debates with little
resolution. 93
Obviously, an NMD system was never deployed.
Clinton outlined his policy for a NMD system in a speech he made on
September 1, 2000 at Georgetown University several months before
he left office. 94 Clinton said that while NMD would not replace
diplomacy and deterrence, it could give the United States "an extra
dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has
complicated the task of preserving peace. ''95 In outlining the specific
NMD system then under development, Clinton said:
The system now under development is designed to work as follows. In
the event of an attack, American satellites would [detect] the launch of
missiles.
Our radar would track the enemy warhead and highly
accurate, high-speed, ground-based interceptors would destroy them
96
before they could reach their target in the United States.

President Clinton further stated that this system would be based in
Alaska and would protect all 50 states. 97 Clinton went on to note
that technological advances were still needed in order for NMD to
work effectively; as a result, Clinton said he was unwilling to move
forward with deployment of a NMD system. 98 Instead, Clinton
authorized a "robust program of development and testing."99
Clinton then addressed the issues surrounding the ABM
Treaty. l0 0 He said that "NMD, if deployed, would require [the United
States] to either adjust the Treaty or withdraw from it."10 1 Clinton
noted that before pursuing such a course the United States must
consider the interests of Russia, NATO allies, and several Asian
countries. 0 2 Clinton finished his speech by saying that deployment

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Grogan, supra note 5, at 811.
See generally id. at 825-58.
Id.
LINDSAY & OHANLON, supra note 67, at Appendix E.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of NMD was an issue for the next President, 0 3 effectively punting the
10 4
ultimate decision to the Bush Administration.
C. PresidentGeorge W. Bush's National Missile Defense Policy
President George W. Bush wasted little time in proposing the
deployment of a NMD system.' 0 5 In a speech before the National
Defense University, President Bush gave a comprehensive statement
of his NMD policy. 10 6 Bush explained that the United States and the
Soviet Union maintained their security during the Cold War on the
"grim premise that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each
other, because doing so Would mean the end of both nations.' 1 7 He
added that the two nations actually codified this relationship by
adopting the ABM Treaty.10 8
The President then noted that the bipolar world in which the
ABM Treaty was created no longer existed, 0 9 as many nations now
have nuclear weapons 1 0 and, of the nations that do have nuclear
weapons, many are not "responsible.""' As a result, the greatest
threat, according to President Bush, is not from the former Soviet
Union but from these other nations. 112 In this atmosphere,3 President
Bush believed the United States needed more than MAD."
President Bush then stated that in the near future, the United
States would possess the capability of deploying a system that could
counter some ballistic missile threats. 114 While the final form of
these defenses is not clear from the speech, President Bush explained
that his Administration would explore numerous options to come up
with an effective defense system. 115
President Bush then announced the dispatch of "high-level
representatives to capitals in Europe, Asia, Australia and Canada to

Id.
103.
James Lindsay, Is the Third Time the Charm? The American Politics of
104.
2001, available at
ETRANGtRE, July-Sept.
POLITIQUE
Missile Defense,
(last visited Nov. 14,
http://www.brook.edu]views/articles/lindsay/200letrangere.htm
2002).
President George W. Bush, Address at the National Defense University,
105.
May 1, 2001, at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nmd/bush20010501.htm.
See id.
106.
107. Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
Id.
110.
111.
Id.
Id.
112.
113.
Id.
114. Id.
115.

Id.
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discuss" missile defense systems." 6 In addition, President Bush said
that the United States must "reach out" to China and Russia as
well. 117 President Bush indicated that he intended to advocate major
changes to the Treaty, or even withdrawal. 118 He said:
Russia and the United States should work together to develop a new
foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century. We should
leave behind the constraints of the ABM Treaty that perpetuates a
relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability.
This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology
during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for
defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other
countries.
That's why we should work together to replace this treaty with a new
framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and
119
especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.

This speech left President Bush's plans open regarding the ABM
Treaty, although it looked as if he advocated a new treaty to replace
the ABM Treaty. Then, on December 13, 2001, President Bush made
120
clear what his plan was for the future of the ABM Treaty.
President Bush announced that he had given "formal notice to
Russia, in accordance with the [ABM] Treaty, that the United States
of America [was] withdrawing" from the Treaty. 12 1 Pursuant to
Article XV of the Treaty, the United States was required to make the
withdrawal effective six months after December 13, 2001.122
President Bush said that "[t]he 1972 ABM Treaty was signed by the
United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a
vastly different world." 123 President Bush noted that the Soviet
Union dissolved since the signing in 1972 and that the hostilities
between the United States and the Soviets that led each nation to
keep "thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at
each other" no longer existed. 124 President Bush's Press Secretary
added that a major consideration for withdrawal from the Treaty was
the fact that a number of rogue and terrorist states had acquired
weapons of mass destruction and the ability to launch such weapons
125
and strike the U.S. mainland.

116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
See id.
119.
Id.
120.
Press Release, supra note 1.
Id.
121.
122.
See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
See Statement by the Press Secretary, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet, Dec. 13,
2001, available at http://www whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html.
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President Bush's decision to terminate the ABM Treaty is fairly
unique in U.S. history. It is arguably the highest profile treaty ever
terminated solely by the President. 126 As a result, President Bush's
decision to terminate the Treaty did not go unnoticed by the
Senate.1 27 Senator Robert Byrd, also an important player in the
Mutual Defense Treaty debates, discussed below, made a pseudolegal
argument
against
President
Bush's
termination
announcement. 1 28 Not consulting with the Senate on decisionmaking involving international agreements is not only dangerous,
according to Senator Byrd, but also "undermines the intent of the
Framers of our Constitution."'129 Senator Bryd continued by saying,
130
"Monarchs make treaties. American Presidents propose treaties.
However, after President Bush's announcement, legal arguments
were the exception rather than the rule for Senators. 131 Those that
challenged the termination of the Treaty did so mostly on political
and strategic grounds, rather than on legal grounds. 132 In fact,
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle actually acknowledged
President Bush's authority to terminate the ABM Treaty without
permission from or consultation with Congress. 133 Senator Daschle
did note that the Democrats were investigating ways to stop the
President from terminating the Treaty and that Congress would have
to "weigh whatever powers of the purse [it] ha[s] as leverage." 3 4
Similar to Senator Daschle's threat, Senator Carl Levin, chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he would seek legislation

126.
Sanger & Bumiller, supra note 2.
127.
Id. This Note focuses on the Senate, as opposed to Congress as a whole,
because the Senate is the house of Congress that is given power in the treaty process
by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
128. Steven Mufson & Dana Milbank, U.S. Sets Missile Defense Treaty Pullout,
Bush to Go Ahead with Missile Defense Tests, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at Al.

129.

Id.

130. Id. However, in early June 2002, 30 House Democrats filed suit in U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia challenging Bush's authority to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty. Dana Milbank, U.S. Withdraws from Missile Treaty, Bush
Presses Congress for $7.8 Billion for Defense System, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at
A28; Lawmakers Sue Bush over ABM Treaty Withdrawal, CNN, June 11, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/20O2/ALLPOLITICS/ 06/11/ congress.abmtreaty/index.html.
131.
See, e.g., Colin McMahon, Russia Reacts Tepidly to ABM Pullout, Moscow
Long Aware of Bush's Intention, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 13, 2001, at 22; Paul Richter &
Robin Wright, Plan to Quit ABM Treaty Called Timely, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at 1;
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Missile Defense Delusion, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A39;
Mufson & Milbank, supranote 128.
132.
See, e.g. McMahon, supra note 131; Richter & Wright, supra note 131;
Biden, supra note 131.
133. McMahon, supra note 131.
134.
Id.
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denying funding to any ABM test that violated the ABM Treaty
35
unless Congress specifically approved the test.
Arguments surrounding the strategic wisdom of President
Bush's decision were also put forth. 13 6 Senator Levin expressed his
137
concern that termination of the Treaty could set off an arms race.
Echoing Senator Levin's concern, Senator Joseph Biden argued that
U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty had the potential to set off an arms
race in Asia.' 3 8 Senator Biden added that termination of the treaty
would lead to a misplacement of resources. 139 According to Biden,
instead of focusing on terrorism, which is the greatest threat the
United States faces, the United States should focus its resources on
an ABM system.140
The debate among academics is much different. The legal
authority of the President to unilaterally terminate a treaty is still a
"highly controversial" topic. 141 Some have questioned President
Bush's decision. 142
This debate raises interesting legal issues
regarding the acceptability of President Bush's actions under
prevailing international legal norms and under U.S. domestic law.
This section of the Note deals with these important issues.
A. InternationalLegal Issues Surrounding Treaty Termination
Two leading international legal texts can be used in evaluating
the international legal issues surrounding the withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty-the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. 143 Using these texts as a
guide, three international legal issues surrounding the termination of
the ABM Treaty will be discussed. First, the plain language of the
Treaty allows for U.S. withdrawal. 144
The Vienna Convention
provides that "a treaty may be terminated in conformity with the
provisions of the treaty," 14 5 and the Restatement uses similar

135.
Richter & Wright, supra note 131.
136.
Id.; Biden, supra note 131; Mufson & Milbank, supra note 128.
137.
Richer & Wright, supra note 131.
138.
Biden, supra note 131; Mufson & Milbank, supra note 128.
139.
Biden, supra note 131.
140.
Id.
141.
Golove, supra note 3, at 1848 n.180.
142.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Bush Can't Operate as a One-Man Act, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2001, at M5; Karin Lee Lawson, The Constitutional Twilight Zone of
Treaty Termination:Goldwater v. Carter, 20 VA. J. INTL' L. 147, 165 (1979); Walter C.
Clemens, Missile Defense: Who Terminates a Treaty?, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 38.
143.
Yoo, supra note 40, at 905-06.
144.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV.
145.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 54, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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language. 146 As noted above, Article XV of the Treaty provides that
"each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have a right
to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests." 147 The phrase "if it decides," allowed the United
States and the Soviet Union to decide for themselves whether
extraordinary events occurred that would jeopardize their supreme
interests. 148 The United States could have argued that more than 20
Third World countries possessed ballistic missiles. 149 The possibility
of North Korea and other similarly situated states launching and
have justified
delivering nuclear weapons to the U.S. mainland could
150
U.S. withdrawal pursuant to the text of the Treaty.
Second, the international legal doctrine of rebus sic stanibus
stands for the notion that all treaties are signed with the
circumstances in mind. 15 1 This doctrine is recognized in both the
The Vienna
Vienna Convention and in the Restatement. 152
Convention provides that a fundamental change in circumstances
would justify withdrawal from a treaty if those circumstances were
an "essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
154
treaty."' 53 The Restatement uses almost identical language.
Again, many countries now have ballistic missiles and pose a threat
to the United States. 15 5 At the time of the signing of the ABM
Treaty, the only nuclear threat to the United States was the Soviet
Union. The Treaty was designed to deal with that situation.
Third, some commentators have suggested that the Treaty was
no longer in force after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 156 In
1997, Clinton negotiated Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with
the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to expand
the Treaty to these four nuclear powers that emerged after the Soviet
Union collapse, 157 but Clinton did not submit the MOUs for approval
by the Senate. 158 Assuming that these MOUs were not binding on
the United States, a plausible argument existed that the ABM Treaty

146.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 332 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
147.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV.
See id.; Yoo, supranote 40, at 913.
148.
Spring, supra note 81, at 37.
149.
Yoo, supranote 40, at 913.
150.
Lawson, supra note 142, at 150.
151.
Vienna Convention, supra note 145, art. 62; RESTATEMENT, supra note 146,
152.

§ 336.
153.
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Vienna Convention, supranote 145, art. 62.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 146, § 336.
Spring, supra note 81, at 31.
Yoo, supra note 40, at 904.
Id.
Id.
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was no longer in force under international law. 159 The Restatement
provides that "when part of a state becomes a new state, the new
state does not succeed to the international agreements to which the
predecessor state was party."'160 The exception to this rule is that the
Treaty is binding if "expressly or by implication, [the successor state]
accepts such agreements" and the other party to the agreement also
The Vienna Convention provides that a "newly
consents. 16 1
independent state is not bound to maintain in force, or to become a
party to, any treaty" because the predecessor was a party to the
The exception to the rule set forth in the Vienna
treaty. 16 2
Convention is that a treaty is binding on the new state if the parties
agree to the continuance of the treaty either expressly or by
conduct. 163 Based on.these provisions, an argument could have been
made that the ABM Treaty was no longer in force. 164 However,
considering the MOUs and the fact that both nations continued to
comply with the treaty by not deploying a national missile defense
system, this was not a very strong argument. 165 In conclusion, while
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law do not support the argument that upon
dissolution of the Soviet Union the ABM Treaty was no longer in
force, both texts do support the U.S.'s legal authority to unilaterally
terminate the ABM Treaty.
B. Domestic Legal Issues Surrounding Treaty Termination, the
Goldwater v. Carter Litigation
The international legal issues seem fairly clear. The withdrawal
provision in Article XV of the Treaty is legal, and, under the words of
that clause, it is up to the United States to decide what extraordinary
events jeopardize its "supreme interest."1 66 A remaining concern is
whether any domestic legal issues surrounding the U.S. withdrawal
from the Treaty exist that might place President Bush's decision in
question. This presents a slightly different issue. In the domestic
realm the important question is not whether the United States can
withdraw from the Treaty. The important question is: Who has the
power to withdraw from a treaty? This issue has only been before the

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 146, § 210.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Vienna Convention, supra note 145, art. 16.
162.
Id. art. 24.
163.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 146, § 210; Vienna Convention, supra note
164.
145, art. 16.
165.
See Yoo, supra note 40, at 904.
See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV.
166.
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Supreme Court one time. 167 That case was the 1979 decision of
Goldwater v. Carter.168 What follows is a look at the background to
that case, its procedural history in the courts, and the final decision
in the Supreme Court.
1. Background to Goldwater v. Carter
On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that
the United States would recognize the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.) as the sole government of China. 169 This decision also meant
that the United States would adopt the P.R.C. belief that Taiwan was
part of China, thus necessitating a "simultaneous withdrawal of
recognition from [Taiwan]. '"17O
Along with the withdrawal of
recognition, the United States announced that it would terminate the
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 171 The United States and
Taiwan entered the Treaty in 1954, and the Treaty had been the
centerpiece of U.S.-Taiwan relations. 172 The Treaty was designed as
treaty."'173
China
anti-mainland
and
"anti-communist
an
Accordingly, the end of the Mutual Defense Treaty was important to
China in the normalization of relations between the United States
and China. 174 Article X of the Treaty provided that, "either party
may terminate [the Treaty] one year after notice has been given to
175
the other party."'
2. The District Court Decision in Goldwater v. Carter
Opposed to Carter's unilateral action, on December 22, 1978
Senator Barry Goldwater, along with numerous other legislators,
176
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Goldwater sought declaratory and injunctive relief against President
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Plaintiffs Brief submitted by Senator Barry Goldwater to U.S. District
Court in Goldwater v. Carter, reprinted in 2 UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 473, 475-76 (Michael J. Glennon & Thomas M. Franck eds.,
1980) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief]. Among the Senators joining the suit were Strom
Thurmond, Orrin Hatch, and Jesse Helms. Id. at 475.
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Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. 177 Goldwater's
argument was premised upon Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that a treaty is considered the "supreme law of the land,"
and upon Article II, which provides that "[the President] shall have
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, providing two thirds of the Senators present concur ... "178
Goldwater argued that under these provisions, "as a logical and
natural consequence, the Senate is part of the authority who
179
possesses the power of deciding upon the termination of a treaty."'
Therefore, according to Goldwater, the term "party" in Article X of the
180
Treaty did not mean the President alone.
In response, the Carter administration made several arguments
to the district court.' 8 ' First, the administration argued that Article
II of the U.S. Constitution does not provide for a congressional role in
treaty termination. 8 2 To construe it in such a way would "be
recognized
constitutional
inconsistent with the President's
responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and the
implementation of treaties. 1 8 3 Second, Carter argued that the
Treaty was terminated "in order to permit the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. Thus, termination was incident
to the President's exclusive recognition power under Article II,
Third, the Carter
[Sections] 2 and 3 of the Constitution.' 18 4
administration argued that the Mutual Defense Treaty created no
domestic law obligations, so its termination fell "squarely within the
President's authority as Commander in Chief."'18 5 Finally, apart from
the arguments on the merits of the claim, the President argued that
the plaintiffs claim was a non-justiciable political question 8 6 and
87
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.'

177.
Id. at 476.
178.
Id. at 479; U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
179.
Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 176, at 479.
180.
Id. at 96; See Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 171, art. X. Goldwater
argued that the approval of either the Senate or Congress in its entirety is required for
the successful termination of a treaty. Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 176, at 484-85.
181.
For an additional summary of these arguments, see ADLER, supra note 167,
at 252.53.
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182.
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On June 6, 1979, Judge Gasch dismissed Goldwater's claim
based on lack of standing.' 8 8 The district court's primary concern, at
that time, was that a "premature judicial declaration might
circumvent the legislative action directed at either approving or
rejecting the President's notice of termination. '189 The district court
believed that its "judicial powers should be exercised only after the
legislative branch had been given the opportunity of acting." 190
Several hours after the dismissal of the suit, the Senate adopted an
amendment to Senate Resolution 15, by a vote of 59 to 35, that stated
"that it is the sense of the Senate that approval of the United States
Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense treaty between
the United States and another nation." 19 1 The plaintiffs then filed a
motion for the district court to alter or amend its decision on June 6,
1979.192 In response to this motion, Judge Gasch argued that while
the amended resolution was not final action by the Senate, it was "the
last expression of the Senate position on its constitutional role in the
treaty termination on process."'1 93 That was enough to quell his
194
initial fears of circumvention of the legislative process.
Consequently, Judge Gasch believed that that plaintiffs did have
standing. 195
Having decided that the plaintiffs had standing, Judge Gasch
turned to whether the claim was non-justiciable because it presented
a political question. 196 The leading case on the political questions
doctrine is Baker v. Carr.197 In Baker, the Supreme Court held that a
case involves a political question if there is
[a] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
198
departments on one question.
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Judge Gasch primarily focused on whether there was a "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment" to one of the branches. 199
Because the Constitution is silent on the issue, Judge Gasch believed
that the "textual commitment formulation" of the doctrine was not
200
satisfied.
After dispensing with the other formulations of the political
20 1
question doctrine, Judge Gasch turned to the merits of the case.
Judge Gasch stated that the President's recognition power under
Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution did not support his
power to terminate a treaty. 20 2 In addition, Judge Gasch argued that
since a treaty is the "supreme law of the land," 20 3 the termination of a
treaty is the repeal of a law. 20 4 Allowing the President to repeal the
law conflicts with his obligation to "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. '20 5 Because of the foregoing conclusions, Judge
Gasch held that "the President's notice of termination must receive
approval of two-thirds of the United States Senate or a majority of
both Houses of Congress for it to be effective under our Constitution
°
to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. 206
3. The Court of Appeals Decision in Goldwater v. Carter
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
decision of Judge Gasch based on the merits of the case. 20 7 The court
limited its holding to the "precise circumstances" of the case. 20 8 The
court made numerous arguments and noted that its ultimate decision
drew on the "totality" of the arguments. 20 9 First, the court dealt with
the argument that because the President needed the consent of the
Senate to enter the Treaty, he needed their consent to terminate the
Treaty. 210 The Court of Appeals believed that if this was true, then
the same analysis would apply to the removal of executive officers
because Senate consent is required for their appointment, but
211
Supreme Court precedent has never required such consent.
Second, the Court of Appeals said that just because a treaty and a
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statute are both considered the supreme law of the land under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause, it does not mean they have the
same characteristics as far as termination is concerned. 2 12 Third,
consent by two-thirds of the Senate is an "extraordinary condition of
the exercise of the President of certain specified powers" and "is not
lightly to be extended. '213 Fourth, the court noted that Senate
powers are "specific, detailed, and limited," while the powers
conferred
to the President
under the Constitution
are
"generalized. '214 "It would take an unprecedented feat of judicial
construction to read into the Constitution an absolute condition
precedent of congressional or Senate approval for termination of all
treaties." 215 Fifth, requiring the consent of two-thirds of the Senate
to terminate a treaty would harm foreign policy. 216 The President
may need to make immediate decisions on treaties. If one-third of the
Senate plus one can veto the President's decision to withdraw from a
treaty, the President's ability to effectively carry out foreign policy
would be harmed.2 17 Sixth, the court noted that while historically a
variety of means have been used to terminate treaties, in no situation
"has a treaty been continued in force over the opposition of the
President. '2 18 Seventh, the President's recognition power supports
the decision to terminate the treaty with China. 219 Once the
President decided to recognize the P.R.C. as the sole government of
China, the defense treaty with Taiwan lost its "meaningful
221
vitality. '220 Finally, the Treaty contained a termination clause.
The "President's authority as Chief Executive is at its zenith when
the Senate has consented to a treaty that expressly provides for
222
termination."
4. The Supreme Court Decision in Goldwater v. Carter
Goldwater appealed to the Supreme Court.2 23 The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals.2 24 Justice

212.
Id. at 704. This is very similar to another argument the court makes that
notes the difference between statutes and treaties, and that analogies between their
making and unmaking should be rejected. Id at 705.
213.
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214.
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Rehnquist wrote an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Stevens. 22 5 Their opinion held that the case
involved a political question and thus was nonjusticiable. 26 In
support of this decision, Justice Rehnquist noted that there was no
constitutional provision dealing with treaty termination and that
different termination procedures may be appropriate for different
treaties; therefore, termination in this case should be controlled by
political standards.2 27 Justice Rehnquist believed his decision was
further supported by the fact that the case involved an issue dealing
22 8
with foreign relations.
Justice Powell concurred in judgment but would have dismissed
the complaint because it was not ripe for judicial review.2 29 He
believed that the Senate never fully asserted its constitutional
authority in the area of treaty termination. 230 No final vote was ever
taken on the resolution declaring that Senate approval was required
for the termination of any mutual defense treaty. 23 1 According to
Justice Powell, until the "political branches reach a constitutional
impasse," the court should not act. 232 Justice Powell then said the
political question doctrine has three key inquiries:
(1) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text
of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (2) Would
resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? (3) Do prudential considerations counsel against
233
judicial intervention?

Powell then explained why "the answer to each of these inquiries
would require [the Court] to decide [the] case if it were ready for
review ."234

Two dissents were written in the case, one by Justices Blackmun
and White, and another by Justice Brennan. 23 5 In their dissent,
Justices Blackmun and White believed that the case should be set for
oral argument and should be given the "plenary consideration it
obviously deserves. '2 3 6 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that
the political question doctrine does not apply when "a court is faced

225.
Id. at 1002-06.
226.
Id. at 1002.
227.
Id. at 1003. Justice Rehnquist relied on one previous Supreme Court
decision, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), in support of this argument.
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with the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been
constitutionally designated as the repository of political decision
making power."237 According to Justice Brennan, this question must
be decided as a matter of constitutional law. 238 He then said the
decision to terminate the Treaty "was a necessary incident to
Executive recognition of the Peking Government. '239 Therefore,
under Justice Brennan's view, the decision of the Court of Appeals
should have been affirmed "insofar as it rests upon the President's
well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition
240
from, foreign governments."

V.

RESOLVING THE TREATY TERMINATION DEBATE

Goldwater v. Carter is the leading case on the topic of
presidential treaty termination, but it did not resolve the
constitutional issues surrounding treaty termination. 241 Since the
decision, seven new justices have been appointed to the Supreme
Court. 242 If a new suit challenging the President's authority to
terminate the ABM Treaty comes before the court, the outcome is
unclear. 243 The most widely-held modern view on the topic is that the
President has the authority to terminate treaties, but it is still a
"highly controversial" topic. 244 Nevertheless, with a Democratic
majority, something similar to Senator Byrd's amendment
theoretically could be passed in the Senate, which could give the
Senators standing to sue the President. 245 The rest of this Note
evaluates the constitutional and functional arguments and
considerations surrounding the presidential termination of treaties.

237.
Id. at 1007.
Id.
238.
239.
Id.
240.
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241.
Ackerman, supra note 142; Lawson, supra note 142, at 165.
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242.
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Ackerman, supra note 142.
243.
244.
Golove, supra note 3, at 1848 n.180.
245.
Democratic Senators have acknowledged the legitimacy of the President's
move from a legal standpoint, therefore such a move is probably unlikely. McMahon,
supra note 131. While House Democrats have filed suit challenging the President's
termination of the treaty, but it is unlikely they will have standing considering
Goldwater v. Carter. See discussion supra Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.4.
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A. The Arguments For and Against the President's UnilateralPower
to Terminate Treaties
The arguments surrounding the presidential authority to
terminate treaties are a source of great academic debate. 246 As will
be shown below, while both supporters and opponents of the
President's power to terminate a treaty have credible and articulate
arguments supporting their position, neither side has the "smoking
gun" argument. 247 This is why the debate on the legal side of the
argument remains unresolved.
Several of the leading legal arguments were set forth in the
Goldwater v. Carter decisions. 248 Two of the more prominent
arguments deserve extended attention and critical evaluation. First,
some argue that a treaty, like a statute, is the supreme law of the
land under the U.S. Constitution.249 Therefore, treaties, like
statutes, cannot be terminated through a unilateral presidential
act. 250

The problem with this argument is that, as the Court of

Appeals noted in the Goldwater case, just because treaties and
statutes are both the supreme law of the land under the Constitution,
it does not follow that they are alike in other characteristics. 25 1 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out their differences
when it was considering Senator Byrd's amendment.25 2
The
Committee wrote that the President's role is the determinative factor
in the treaty process. The Senate only authorizes the ratification of
the treaty. 253 In addition, the Committee argued that
[the President] decides at the outset whether to commence treaty
negotiations. He decides whether to sign a treaty. He decides whether
to exchange instruments of ratification after a treaty has been approved
by the Senate. At each of these stages, it is the President who has the
power to determine whether to proceed-and thus whether treaty
relations will ultimately exist. 254

Therefore, the Supremacy Clause can be seen as a "status-prescribing
provision, not as a procedure-prescribing provision." 25 5 As a result,

246.
247.
248.
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249.
250.

Golove, supra note 3, at 1848 n.180.
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See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979); Goldwater v.
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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the argument based on the Supremacy Clause is not as strong as it
may appear at first glance.
A second prominent argument by advocates of congressional
involvement in treaty terminations is that because the Senate
approval is required to enter into a treaty, its consent should be
required to exit the treaty.2 56 As the Court of Appeals noted in
Goldwater, a major problem with this argument is that
[t]he constitutional institution of advice and consent of the Senate,
provided two-thirds of the Senators concur, is a special and
extraordinary condition of the exercise by the President of certain
specified powers under Article II. It is not lightly to be extended in
instances not set forth in the Constitution. Such an extension by
implication is not proper unless that implication is unmistakably
257
clear.

In addition, in response to those that advocate that only a majority of
Senators need to approve of the termination, Professor Louis Henkin
points out that the Senate acting alone, without the House of
258
Representatives, is an extraordinary circumstance in itself.
Because advice, consent and Senate action alone are extraordinary
conditions and should not be extended by implication, it does not
make sense to extend these ideas to the context of treaty termination
where there is no language in the Constitution to support such an
259
extension.
Those who advocate the President's power to terminate treaties
also provide a host of arguments in support of their view. Three of
the more prominent arguments are discussed below. First, some
argue that the President's recognition power, under Article II, Section
3 of the U.S. Constitution "gives him sole authority to recognize or not
recognize foreign governments as well as foreign states or, the
incorporation of territory into a state. '26 0
This argument was
important in the Goldwater decisions at both the appellate court and
the Supreme Court. 2 61 However, a problem with an argument based
on the President's recognition power is its limited applicability.
While the argument applies well to situations where recognition is at
issue in a treaty, it does not apply well in a situation, such as the
ABM Treaty debate, where recognition of a country was not the

256.

Louis Henkin, Litigating the President's Power to Terminate Treaties, 73
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257.
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261.
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reason for terminating the Treaty. 262 In the ABM debate, the
263
primary reason for pulling out of the Treaty was security concerns.
As a result, the recognition argument does not justify the termination
of the Treaty.
Historical precedent is another argument supporters of the
President's power to terminate treaties utilize. 264 The Legal Advisor
to the State Department constructed a memorandum during the
Mutual Defense Treaty debates that outlined 13 instances in U.S.
265
history where the President unilaterally terminated a treaty.
From this, one can reasonably argue that the historical trend
supports the President's power to terminate treaties. 266 However, not
all agree with the State Department's analysis. 267 One commentator,
who supports the view that historical precedent points to the
President having sole power in this area, admits that the "many
instances of treaty termination are so complex and ambiguous as to
allow for conflicting inferences .... ,"268 Judge MacKinnon, in his
scathing dissent in the Court of Appeals decision in Goldwater v.
Carter,wrote,
In almost 200 years of American history these are the only instances
that [the President] has been able to dredge up in an effort to support
his claim to absolute power. Analysis of such instances, however, does
not support the [President's] contentions. . . . On examination it
appears that among the 13 instances upon which the President relies,
there were only two minor treaties in which the President could be said
to have acted alone since 1788.
Reliance upon such miniscule
precedent forcibly illustrates the great weakness in the President's
claim to absolute power in the present circumstances involving a
269
Defense Treaty.

In addition, David Gray Adler, after an extensive examination of the
historical record surrounding treaty interpretation, concluded that
"the historical record affords no support for those who would claim a
'2 70
unilateral presidential power for the termination of treaties.

262.
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after is dissolution.
263.
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From this one can gather, at least, that reasonable minds disagree on
the subject.
A third argument in favor of unilateral presidential power is that
the President's "preeminent position in controlling foreign affairs
encompasses the authority to terminate treaties." 271 The President's
preeminent power to conduct foreign affairs was articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.272 Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland stated,
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation ....
As Marshall said in his
great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its
273
sole representative with foreign nations.'

Later in the decision, the court used even stronger wording, saying
that the Court recognized the "very delicate, plenary, and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations-a power which does not require as
a basis for its existence an act of Congress. '274 There are several
problems with the "sole organ" argument. One potential problem
with this argument, according to one scholar, is that the CurtissWright decision "is deeply flawed and has been soundly repudiated"
by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 275 Since the Curtiss-Wright
decision, the Supreme Court has "uniformly upheld the view that
Presidential power over foreign affairs is derived from, and limited
by, the Constitution. '276 Another argument that undermines the
validity of the "sole organ" argument is that textually, under Article
2 77
II, the President clearly does not have the sole power over treaties.
As mentioned throughout this piece, Article II requires the President
to obtain the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate for any
treaty he wishes to enter on behalf of the United States. 278 At the
least, it is not clear that the "sole organ" applies in the context of
279
treaty termination.

271.
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it as an argument in favor of presidential power in treaty termination. See id.
272.
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
273.
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275.
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An area that both supporters and opponents look to for answers
is the intent of the constitutional framers. 280 The Constitution, as
noted above, is silent on the matter of treaty termination.2 8 1 This has
led scholars to attempt to discern the intent of the framers. One
commentator suggests that
[t]he intentions of the Founding Fathers, with respect to the treaty
power, are clear. To secure the ratification of the small states it was
essential that all states had equal voice in the treaty power, so that
their interests would not be ignored or sacrificed. . . It seems then
wholly unrealistic to believe that the Framers would have unbalanced
this carefully drafted system by not providing that the treaty-making
28 2
power included the power to terminate treaties as well.

Commentators that argue in favor of unilateral presidential power to
terminate treaties look to the framers, but believe such inquiries are
inconclusive. 28 3 Professor Henkin wrote that "the Constitution does
not speak of 'foreign policy,' nor of making or implementing foreign
policy. It is not apparent that the Framers thought in those
terms." 28 4 Henkin believes that the case for the President's power to
unilaterally terminate treaties is 'not rooted in history "but in the
nature the office has become.
Termination of a treaty is an
international act, and the President, and only the President, acts for
the United States in foreign affairs. '28 5 Another commentator has
written that "it is not possible to glean the intent of the framers from
a few isolated pronouncements. For the most part, the views
expressed lack sufficient specificity; they certainly do not address the
specific issue of termination of a treaty pursuant to its terms.

28s 6

In

sum, there is a large and mostly unresolved debate on the intent of
the framers.
It is difficult to say what one can take away from all of these
conflicting arguments. Professor Glennon summed up the situation
fairly well when he wrote
The constitutional text does not address the matter. No Supreme Court
case has reached the merits of the controversy .... It is thus difficult to
find any constitutional custom on the matter; nor is there even the
appearance of a practice of treaty abrogation, which apparently has
occurred only once in American history .... The intent of the Framers
is thoroughly ambiguous. The most reasonable mode of analysis,
therefore, since the application of all other primary, secondary, and

280.
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tertiary sources fails to resolve the issue, is to resort to functional
2 87
considerations.

This Note next turns to functional considerations in the treaty
termination debate.
B. FunctionalAnalysis of the Treaty TerminationDebate
A functional analysis of this debate reveals that the President
should have the power to terminate treaties unilaterally. Therefore,
this Note concludes that the Senate's tacit acknowledgment of such
power should be formally recognized. Before going further, a cursory
look at the political theories behind international relations helps
demonstrate the structural advantages the President has in the area
of foreign affairs. There are two competing schools of international
The basic
relations theory-realism and institutionalism. 288
argument behind realism is that "international politics is shaped by
states' pursuit of power and by the distribution ... of power among
According to the realist school of thought, the
states."28 9
international political scene is anarchy and states seek to maximize
their power in this anarchy. 2 90 Institutionalism, on the other hand,
argues that "states can cooperate in a wide variety of ways that allow
them to escape the prisoner's dilemmas created by international
anarchy."291 Both of these schools of thought operate under the
presumption that, for the international system to work, states must
be headed by rational, unitary actors. 292 These actors "identify
threats, develop responses, and evaluate the costs, and benefits that
There are, naturally,
arise from different policy options. '293
limitations to these theories. Political and bureaucratic aspects of the
U.S. system will constrain foreign policy, and pressing domestic
issues may "overtake national interests" at times. 294 Nevertheless,
the ideal of unitary national action on the international front that
should guide a state's approach to developing effective foreign policy,
295
whether one is a realist or an institutionalist.
In 1961, William Fulbright published an article calling for
greater presidential authority in the area of foreign affairs. 296 While
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he did not explicitly rely on realism or institutionalism to support his
arguments, he did agree that there is a need for unified foreign
policy. 297 While the world has changed dramatically since his time,
much of his theory still has application today. 298 When Fulbright
wrote his article, the concerns were "communism, fascism, aggressive
nationalism, and the explosive awakening of long quiescent
peoples. ' 299 While the concerns are different today, the need for a
unified policy is not.30 0 The concerns of the modern world are
different because the world is more international, more than two
powers hold nuclear weapons, and terrorism may be the largest
threat. However, this type of world demands, just as in the past, a
30 1
consistent, unified foreign policy.
Fulbright argued that the President's effectiveness is
"principally a function of his own knowledge, wisdom, vision, and
authority. '30 2 It is "not within our powers to confer wisdom or
perception on the Presidential person. It is within our power to grant
or deny him authority. 30 3 Excessive limits on the President in the
area of foreign affairs limit such authority.3 0 4 In articulating this
point, Fulbright said,
It is exceedingly difficult-if not impossible-to devise unified policies
oriented to a clear and definite conception of the national interest
through a system in which power and responsibility for foreign policy
are "shared and overlapping." Policies thus evolved are likely to be illco-ordinated, short-ranged, and often unsuccessful, while the
responsibility for failure is placed squarely on the President, neither
"shared" nor "overlapping." 30 5

Similar sentiments existed at the time of the constitutional framers
as well.3 0 6 In The Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton said,
"[D]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number
is increased, these qualities will be diminished."30 7 From Fulbright's
and Hamilton's arguments, it follows that the President is best
situated to be in charge of foreign affairs.
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The foregoing analysis does not mean that Congress should play
no role in foreign affairs. While the deliberation of Congress is
important in many areas, it can often be a liability in the area of
foreign affairs.30 8 Congress consists of popularly-elected individuals
30 9
whose main concern, and rightly so, is their local constituents.31 0
Foreign policy expertise is typically not a virtue of Congress.
Congress does have a role in providing a check should the President
get overzealous with his foreign affairs power. 311 Congress has two
important tools that act as checks on the Executive Branch if the
President uses his authority unwisely.3 12 First, "Congress' control
over appropriations is its ultimate constitutional check on the
President's foreign relations power." 313 Second, if the President
continually ignores concerns that the Senate may have in foreign
affairs and with respect to treaties, the Senate may not give its
314
consent on future treaties.
In applying functional analysis to the question of who should
hold the power to terminate treaties, a strong argument can be made
that the President should have unilateral authority to terminate
treaties. Using the ABM Treaty as an example, one can see the
advantages of having the President in control. President Bush faces
a world in which a number of rogue and terrorists states have
acquired weapons of mass destruction, along with the ability to
launch such weapons and strike the U.S. mainland.3 15 Countering
such abilities was a top priority for President Bush from the
beginning of his administration. 316 President Bush sent "high-level
representatives to capitals in Europe, Asia, Australia and Canada to
discuss" missile defense systems and reached out to China and Russia
as well.3 17 Whether one agrees with President Bush's decision, he
was elected with knowledge that NMD would be a high priority on his
agenda. The ultimate decision President Bush made was the result of
months of negotiating with high level officials around the world, and
Ultimately, President Bush
was all part of a unified plan.3 18
terminated the ABM Treaty pursuant to its terms as part of his plan
3 19
to ensure the national security interests of the United States.
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The deliberation of Congress in the area of foreign affairs can be
problematic at times, as noted above. 320 President Bush would
probably still be debating with Congress were it involved with the
decision to terminate the ABM Treaty. There are two potential
problems with such a scenario in the context of this debate. First,
Congress would have been working at a large information deficit, not
only because of its lack of expertise in foreign affairs, but also because
Congress would not be privy to the months of confidential meetings
that took place prior to President Bush's decision. 321 Second, more
delay equates to more time without a missile shield. Assuming such
a shield is possible and technology exists that could be deployed and
be effective in a relatively short amount of time, the sooner such a
shield is established the better, particularly when the stakes are
nuclear. It should be noted that even though Congress was excluded
from the decision to terminate the treaty, it still maintained its
checks on the President. 3 22 Indeed, both Senator Daschle and
Senator Levin threatened to use the power of the purse in the wake of
323
President Bush's decision to terminate the ABM Treaty.
The Senate should take this opportunity to clarify its apparent
belief in the President's power to unilaterally terminate treaties.
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle has made it clear that he
believes the President has the power to terminate treaties. 324 The
lack of any other vocal opposition based on legal. grounds indicates
that others share Senator Daschle's view. Thirty members of the
House of Representatives did file suit in district court arguing that
President Bush did not have the power to terminate the ABM Treaty,
but no Senators have joined in that suit.32 5 The lack of Senators
willing to join the suit further demonstrates the Senate's apparent
326
acknowledgement of a President's power to terminate treaties.
It seems, therefore, the debate over whether the President has
327
the authority to terminate treaties has become largely academic.
The Senate should take this opportunity to clarify its belief. While
the Senate does not have the power to declare constitutionality, it can
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pass a resolution which specifies its apparent belief that; the
President has the power to terminate treaties. 328 Such an action has
several advantages. First, it settles a long existing debate. Second, it
closes the door on another Goldwater v. Carter. Should the President
need to terminate a treaty in the national interests of the United
States and pursuant to his vision of U.S. foreign policy, such a
resolution would deny Senators standing to challenge the action in
the U.S. courts. 329 With an almost entirely new Supreme Court, it is
possible that the Court would get to the merits of the next
controversy. Such a challenge would be against the interests of the
United States for it intrudes on the President's crucial role of shaping
U.S. foreign policy.
A possible criticism of such an action is that the Senate would
either stop approving treaties or would put many conditions on their
approval. 330 One problem with this criticism is that the Senate would
have had the same incentive after President Carter unilaterally
terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty. The resolution advocated
here would not add to that incentive. In addition, this power is
something that Congress seems to acknowledge. 331 The Senate has
made no legal challenge to the President's termination of the ABM
Treaty. Also, the Senate, in passing the clarifying resolution, can
stipulate that while the President has the power to terminate
treaties, he should consult with Congress before doing so. The
President probably will not always consult with the Senate, but the
resolution will encourage him to do so. More importantly, the
Congressional checks on Presidential power discussed above will also
encourage the President to keep Congress content. 332 It wi]l be
difficult for the President to achieve his goals if the Senate uses its
333
power of the purse or withholds its consent to a treaty.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The continued validity of the ABM Treaty has been a source of
controversy, particularly since the announcement of SDI in the
Reagan administration.3 3 4 President Bush took a definitive stance on
this controversy when he announced his decision to terminate the
ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001.3 35 There are many legal issues
surrounding such a move. 3 36 While the international legal issues are
not very controversial, 337 the domestic issues are more
controversial. 338 The Goldwater v. Carter litigation demonstrates
many of the arguments surrounding the debate over whether the
President has the power to unilaterally terminate a U.S. treaty. 33 9 A
close analysis of these domestic legal issues does not resolve the
controversy.3 40 Instead, a functional analysis is required.3 4 1 This
functional analysis reveals that the President should have the power
to unilaterally terminate a treaty because it maintains foreign policy
effectiveness.3 42 The Senate, which informally recognizes343this power,
should recognize it formally through a Senate resolution.
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